Abstract. In the last decade, location information became easily obtainable using off-the-shelf mobile devices. This gave a momentum to developing Location Based Services (LBSs) such as location proximity detection, which can be used to find friends or taxis nearby. LBSs can, however, be easily misused to track users, which draws attention to the need of protecting privacy of these users.
Introduction
Nowadays, many mobile devices (e.g., smartphones or tablets) can easily measure and report precise locations in real time, so that several Location-Based Services (LBSs) over mobile networks have emerged in recent years. A basic LBS is location proximity detection that enables a user to test whether or not another user is nearby. This promising function has boosted the development of social applications to help users to find their nearby friends [22] , Uber cars [17] , or medical personnel in an event of emergency [33] . Although some users have nothing against sharing their location, many privacy-aware users want to protect it from third parties. The reason for that are the possible privacy threats caused by location proximity detection [31] that may lead to serious consequences, including unintended tracking, stalking, harassment, and even kidnapping. Potential adversaries range from curious social media contacts to abusive family members and even professional criminals (e.g., burglars checking if a victim is at home), and sometimes the level of their technological skills may be high. Hence, it is desirable to provide location proximity detection services which preserve the privacy of the users' exact location. Furthermore, modern law (e.g., the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 1 ) obligates companies to better protect users' privacy. This affects companies such as smartphone manufacturers that frequently offer built-in LBSs and LBS providers that provide additional privacy-preserving LBSs based on the result of the Privacy-Preserving Location Proximity (PPLP) protocol, e.g., for advertising ongoing movies in nearby cinemas to friends in the vicinity.
Our Contributions
Our contributions are as follows:
Efficient PPLP Schemes. We design and evaluate practically efficient Euclidean distance-based Privacy-Preserving Location Proximity (PPLP) schemes (i) using a mix of Secure Two-Party Computation (STPC) protocols, (ii) using DGK encryption [7] and Bloom filters [4] , and (iii) using exponential ElGamal encryption [13] over elliptic curves (ECs) and Bloom filters. This allows us to provide custom solutions for different PPLP applications with different requirements with respect to communication, computation, and runtime. Optimizations. We present an optimization of the Boolean circuit for computing Euclidean and Manhattan distance for 32-bit values that reduces the number of AND gates by up to 22%. Pre-computation. We consider two scenarios where (i) a precomputation scenario where two parties run a PPLP protocol on an ongoing basis, which allows pre-computations (e.g., overnight while charging) and substantially reduces computation and communication in the online phase, and (ii) an adhoc scenario where two strangers run a PPLP protocol only once (e.g., for mobile health care), and pre-computations are not possible. Extensive Performance Evaluation. We give an extensive communication comparison of our PPLP protocols and the PPLP protocols presented in recent related work. Furthermore, we implement our most efficient protocols (two STPC-based and one EC-ElGamal-based algorithm) and give a runtime comparison of them and the most efficient recently introduced PPLP protocol of Hallgren et al. [15, 16] . Additionally, we run our protocols in a real-world mobile Internet setting.
Related Work
So far several solutions for privacy-preserving location proximity (PPLP) schemes have been proposed, e.g., [6, 16, 25, [29] [30] [31] [35] [36] [37] . In early literature [6] , privacy-preserving location proximity computation is realized by an imprecise location-based range query that allows a user to approximately learn if any of its communication partners is within a fixed distance from her current location.
To realize such queries, a user's cloaked location (i.e., the precise location of the user is put into a larger region) is sent to the service provider which handles the service request and sends back a probabilistic result to the user. However, this scheme may leak some location information since the service provider knows each individual is within a particular region.
Since then there is a large number of works (e.g., [12, 31, 31, 35] ) on using a (semi-)trusted third party for assisting the clients in location proximity detection. [30] introduces a PPLP solution called FriendLocator in the client-server setting. Here, each user first maps her location into a shared grid cell (granule), and the converted location is encrypted and sent to the location server who will blindly compute the proximity results for the user. Similar approaches relying on geographic grid are adopted in [12, 31] .
In the recent work [35] , Zheng et al. proposed a novel scheme which is based on spatial-temporal location tags that are extracted from environmental signals. A user can learn a group of users that are within her vicinity region with the help of a semi-trusted server. However, collaborating with a third party (whose reputation is uncertain) for proximity detection may incur the risk of compromising location privacy or many other security issues. For better privacy protection, it would therefore be of great interest to develop PPLP schemes without requiring the existence of a (semi-)trusted third party.
Zhong et al. [36] present three PPLP protocols (called Louis, Lester and Pierre) [2] . Lester and Pierre do not rely on any third party. The common construction idea behind those protocols is to compute the location distance using additively homomorphic public key encryption (AHPKE) between two principals with a distance obfuscation technique. However, in all their schemes the users learn the mutual distance that might be sensitive information in many situations.
Narayanan et al. [25] show three PPLP protocols that reduce the proximity detection problem to private equality testing (in the first two protocols) or private set intersection (in the third protocol). Their protocols are run based on the location which is defined as a set of adjacent triangles of a hexagon (that divides a grid). The proximity detection is achieved by testing whether two users share at least one triangle. However, as discussed in [29] , the protocols of [25] may introduce different errors in practice.
Seděnka et al. [29] present three hybrid PPLP protocols that combine AHPKE schemes with secure two-party computation (STPC). Two users would first use the AHPKE scheme (e.g., Paillier [27] ) to privately compute the distance of their locations (with different distance equations in each protocol), and then run a STPC protocol (e.g., the private inequality test protocol from [10] , or garbled circuits [20] ) to test whether the resulting location distance is within a pre-defined threshold. However, these PPLP protocols incur a high communication and computation overhead. Furthermore their protocols have multiple rounds of communication and using OT-based multiplication, which we use in our PPLP protocol ABY AY (cf. Sect. 3.2), is substantially more efficient than AHPKE as shown in [8] .
Hallgren et al. [16] develop a PPLP protocol built on only AHPKE to test whether two users' locations are within a given distance threshold (without a trusted third party). Their construction makes use of a similar distance obfuscation method as in [36] . The main difference is that Hallgren et al.'s scheme hides the exact distance between two users.
In recent work, Zhu et al. [37] propose two efficient PPLP schemes for different geometric situations (i.e., polygon or circle). However, their schemes are subject to linear equation solving attacks. Namely, a malicious sender who honestly follows the protocol execution can learn the location coordinates (x, y) of a receiver by solving the relevant linear equation (involving x and y) implied by the proximity answers returned by the receiver (in one query). The major problem of these schemes is that two equations share the same randomness which can be eliminated by a division. We show the attacks against Zhu et al. ' 
Preliminaries
General Notations. We let κ be the security parameter and ρ be the statistical security parameter. Let [n] = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of integers between 1 and n. We write a $ ← S to denote the operation which samples a uniform random a element from set S. Let denote the concatenation operation of two strings, |a| denote the bit-length of a string a, and #S denotes the number of elements in set S.
Euclidean Distance. For computing the distance in our Privacy-Preserving Location Proximity (PPLP) protocols, we use Euclidean distance, which is computed as follows for two dimensions: < T 2 to determine if two users of the PPLP protocol are close to each other.
In the following, we review the cryptographic tools used in our paper.
Secure Two-Party Computation
We implement our PPLP protocols using the ABY framework for mixed-protocol Secure Two-Party Computation (STPC) [8] . We make use of two sharing types implemented in ABY: Yao and Arithmetic sharing.
Yao Sharing. Yao sharing denotes Yao's Garbled Circuits (GCs) protocol [32] . Using GCs, two mistrusting parties P 0 and P 1 can securely compute a public function f on their respective inputs x 0 and x 1 . For this, P 0 garbles the plaintext Boolean circuit C (a Boolean circuit which represents f ) into garbled circuit C. P 0 sends C and its garbled inputs to P 1 . P 1 obtains its garbled inputs using Oblivious Transfer (OT) [1, 24] , and P 1 evaluates C. Depending on which party gets the output, either P 0 sends the decryption keys for the output to P 1 , or P 1 sends the obtained garbled outputs to P 0 , or both parties do this if they both get the output. We denote shares of input bit x as ((k 0 , k 1 ), k x ), where P 0 holds both keys x Y 0 = (k 0 , k 1 ) and P 1 holds the key that corresponds to its input bit
In Yao sharing, evaluation of XOR gates is performed locally without communication [21] , whereas evaluation of AND gates requires sending 2k bits [34] .
Arithmetic Sharing. Arithmetic sharing denotes a generalization of the GMW protocol [14] for unsigned integer numbers in the ring Z 2 . In Arithmetic sharing, an integer x is shared between P 0 and P 1 as
. The function to be evaluated is represented as arithmetic circuit, which operates on unsigned integer values and consists of addition, subtraction, and multiplication gates modulo 2 only. Addition and subtraction gates can be evaluated locally without interaction between the parties, whereas evaluation of multiplication gates requires interaction and OT-based precomputations [8] . 
Notation
Y = A2Y ( x A ).
Additively Homomorphic Public-Key Encryption Scheme
An additively homomorphic public-key encryption (AHPKE) scheme is a probabilistic encryption scheme which consists of the following three algorithms:
-Key Generation (KGen). Given the security parameter κ, the algorithm returns the public and private key pair (pk, sk). -Encryption (Enc). This algorithm takes a message m ∈ M from a plaintext space M and a public key pk as inputs, and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C where C is the ciphertext space. -Decryption (Dec). This algorithm takes the secret key sk and a ciphertext as inputs, and outputs the plaintext m.
For two ciphertext C 1 = Enc(pk, m 1 ) and C 2 = Enc(pk, m 2 ), we have the following additively homomorphic properties:
Using the above homomorphic additions, it is also possible to efficiently compute multiplications and divisions by a plaintext value v ∈ M using the squareand-multiply algorithm:
We require that the AHPKE schemes used in our implementations satisfy standard semantic security. In Table 1 , we briefly review two concrete instantiations of AHPKE, i.e., the construction by Damgård et al. (DGK) [7] and Lifted ElGamal [9] instantiated with Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). Let EC : y 2 = x 3 + ax + b denote an elliptic curve over a prime field GF(p) with curve parameters a, b ∈ GF(p). When the modulus n is clear from the context, then the modular operation mod n may be omitted. Table 1 . Additively homomorphic public-key encryption (AHPKE) schemes used in this paper.
DGK [7] Lifted ElGamal [9] KGen(κ)
1. Choose two random large primes p, q 1. Choose φ-bits prime p
4. Choose φ-bits primes (vp, vq),
Calculate m by Pohlig-Hellman Alg. [28] Full decryption is not required
Bloom filter (BF) [4] is a probabilistic data structure that provides spaceefficient storage of a set and that can efficiently test whether an element is a member of the set. The probabilistic property of BF may lead to false positive matches, but no false negatives. It is well-known that the more elements are added to the BF, the larger the probability of false positives gets. To reduce the false positive rate, we follow the approach of [26] , i.e., a BF with 1.44 N bits for a set with size N has a false positive rate (FPR) of 2 − . We review the algorithms of a Bloom filter as follows: Random oracles were first introduced by Bellare and Rogaway [3] as a tool to prove security of a cryptographic scheme. In this work, we assume that the hash function is modeled as a random oracle. Basically, a random oracle is stateful, i.e., for a random oracle query H(m) for some input m ∈ {0, 1} * , it proceeds as follows:
-With respect to the first query on m, the oracle just returns a truly random value r m from the corresponding domain, and records the tuple (m, r m ) into its query list HList. -If m ∈ HList, then the oracle just returns its associated random value r m recorded in HList.
Efficient PPLP Schemes from ABY
We show in this section how the ABY framework for Secure Two-Party Computation (STPC) [8] can be used for Privacy-Preserving Location Proximity (PPLP). For describing ABY-based protocols, we use the following notation described in Table 2 . We design two protocols for PPLP: (i) based on Yao sharing only and (ii) based on a mix of Arithmetic and Yao sharing, which we describe in the following. 
ABY Y : A PPLP Scheme from Yao Sharing
The advantage of the Yao-based PPLP protocol is that it has a small and constant number of rounds, which makes it well-suited for high-latency networks. Since we operate on unsigned integers in ABY, we must make sure that no underflows occur for which we see two possible options for computing the Euclidean distance: (i)
We slightly improve this circuit by observing that instead of individually selecting the maximum and the minimum, we can also swap the order of the two x values if x 1 > x 0 (and the same for the y values). Hence, we replace the two MUX gates by one Conditional Swap gate, which using the construction of [21] has the same costs as only one MUX gate ( AND gates, where is the bitlength of the operands). The functionality of Conditional Swap (a , b ) ←CondSwap(a, b, s) on inputs a and b, and selection bit s is defined as
Although this technique brings only slight performance improvement for Euclidean distance (0.4% fewer AND gates for 32-bit coordinates), it gains more significance when used in other privacypreserving distance metrics, e.g., Manhattan distance (22% fewer AND gates for 32-bit coordinates).
In our Yao-based PPLP scheme (denoted as ABY Y ) given in Fig. 1 , the following gates are used: 2(GT( ) + CondSwap( ) + SUB( ) + MUL(σ)) + ADD(σ), where GT( ) is an -bit greater-than circuit ( AND gates [20] ), CondSwap( ) is an -bit Conditional Swap gate ( AND gates [21] ), SUB( ) is an -bit subtraction circuit ( AND gates [20] ), MUL(σ) is a σ-bit multiplication circuit (2σ 2 − σ AND gates [20] ), and ADD(σ) is a σ-bit addition circuit (σ AND gates [5] ). The values and σ are the bitlengths of the computed values. In our setting, = 32 bits (the bitlength of a coordinate) and σ = 64 bits (the bitlength of the resulting squared value).
The aforementioned gates result in the following communication requirements between parties: 6 + 4σ
2 − σ = 16512 AND gates = 528384 bytes of communication with 256 bit communication per AND gate using the half-gates technique of [34] . This scheme requires 2 messages in the online phase.
ABY AY : A PPLP Scheme from Arithmetic and Yao Sharing
We design a protocol for PPLP using a mix of Arithmetic and Yao sharing, which we denote as ABY AY . The use of Arithmetic sharing is advantageous for this scheme-it (i) decreases the communication and computation overhead for the PPLP, and (ii) can decrease protocol runtimes in low-latency networks. However, ABY Y can still be significantly faster in high-latency networks, such as LTE in areas with very poor signal reception, which is, however, uncommon in crowded areas where people usually meet. Our protocol requires the following gates: 6 · MUL A (σ) + A2Y(σ) + GT(σ), where MUL A (σ) is a σ-bit multiplication in Arithmetic sharing, A2Y(σ) is a σ-bit Arithmetic to Yao sharing conversion, GT(σ) is a σ-bit greater-than gate (σ AND gates [20] ), and σ is the bitlength of the squared distance. Our protocol for mixed-protocol SMPC-based PPLP is shown in Fig. 2 .
In total, 6 multiplication gates in Arithmetic sharing, 1 Arithmetic to Yao conversion gate, and σ AND gates in Yao sharing are required in this scheme. This results in 12σ 2 + 19κσ bits of communication. In our setting with the bitlength of the squared value σ = 64, this yields 45056 bytes of communication, which is a factor 11× improvement over ABY Y . However, this scheme requires 4 messages in the online phase (2× more than for ABY Y ).
Efficient PPLP Schemes from Homomorphic Encryption
In this section, we show how to build efficient privacy preserving location proximity (PPLP) schemes which are suitable for mobile devices. In our construction, we will extensively use a one-way hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z p which will be modeled as a random oracle in the security analysis, where p is a large prime chosen in each scheme. , where λ = 0.7642 is the Landau-Ramanujan constant, since we insert only unique elements in T that are smaller than or equal to τ 2 [11, Sect. 2.3]. However, the distance d should be also hidden from both parties to preserve privacy. Hence, we cannot let party A directly input the distance x = d to test the location proximity. To protect the distance from A, we make use of additively homomorphic PKE scheme (either DGK or ElGamal shown in Table 1 ) to enable both parties to jointly compute a distance d based on party A's public key but B blinds d with two fresh random values (i.e., (r, s)). Namely, A will decrypt the ciphertext computed by B to get the blinded distance d = s · (r + d) mod p where p is a prime. Our distance obfuscation method is inspired by the Lester protocol [36] , but is tailored to the additively homomorphic PKE schemes we use. To allow A to get the location proximity result, we further randomize the set T to another set X = {x 1 , . . . , x m }, s.t.
We use a Bloom filter to store the set X to reduce the storage and communication costs.
Security Model. We consider the honest-but-curious (semi-honest) setting where both parties honestly follow the protocol specification without deviating from it in any way, e.g., providing malicious inputs. However, any party might passively try to infer information about the other party's input from the protocol messages. This model is formulated by ideally implementing the protocol with a Trusted Third Party (TTP) T which receives the inputs of both parties and outputs the result of the defined function. Security requires that, in the real implementation of the protocol (without a TTP), none of the parties learns more information than what is returned by T in the ideal implementation. Namely, for any semi-honest adversary that successfully attacks a real protocol, there must exist a simulator S that successfully attacks the same protocol in the ideal world. Let Dist be a function which takes as input the coordinates (x A , y A , x B , y B ) of the two parties and outputs the distance d between them. In the following, we define an ideal functionality of PPLP.
An ideal functionality F PPLP of our upcoming PPLP protocol with private inputs x A , y A and x B , y B and a public distance set T with threshold τ ∈ N, is defined as: (Dist(x A , y A , x B , y B ) ∈ T?1 : 0)).
We say that a PPLP protocol Π securely realizes functionality F PPLP if: for all Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) adversaries A, there exists a PPT simulator S, such that
where ≈ denotes computational indistinguishability.
Σ DGK : A PPLP Scheme from DGK
We fist introduce our PPLP protocol Table 1 ), which provides a fast pre-computation phase. This PPLP scheme running between two parties A and B is shown in Fig. 3 . A learns the location proximity result, i.e., whether or not the distance between A and B is smaller than a pre-defined threshold T .
Remark 1.
In our PPLP scheme, we consider some possible optimizations on generating the blinded distance. We separate the ciphertexts C 1 , C 2 , and C 3 into two steps. We observe that the exponentiations (e.g., R 1 = h r1 ) related to the random values ( r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ) of these ciphertexts can be precomputed. Note that each computation of R i = h ri needs a full exponentiation with 2.5φ bits exponent (e.g., φ = 256). In contrast, the size of the location coordinate and the blinded distance, i.e., the encrypted message, is much smaller, e.g., ρ = 16 bits. Hence, an exponentiation related to a message (e.g., g −2xA ) can be done more efficiently online. For the online phase, we only need to compute the exponentiations related to the messages, so that only three exponentiations with 'small' exponents (depending on the message space) are required at party A. We can do similar pre-computations at party B. Furthermore, in order to compute the ciphertext C d at party B, we can use simultaneous multi-exponentiation (with variable bases) [23, Algorithm 14 .88] to speed up the computation. Then, the computation of C d roughly needs 1.3 times that of a regular modular exponentiation. Fig. 3 is a secure computation of F PPLP in the honest-but-curious model. Proof. We present the security analysis with respect to two aspects: (i) no corrupted party B can learn the input set of an honest party A; (ii) no corrupted party A can learn the resulting distance. The security against corrupted party B is guaranteed by the security of DGK, since all inputs of A are encrypted. Hence, the simulator S can just replace the real ciphertexts with random ones. Any adversary distinguishing this change can be used to break DGK.
Theorem 1. If DGK is semantically secure and the hash function H is modeled as random oracle, then the proposed PPLP scheme Σ DGK in
As for a corrupted party A, we claim that A cannot obtain any useful information from a blinded distance d i = s · (r + d i ) and the Bloom filter BF. We first show that the inputs (i.e., blinded distances) of the random oracles are unique in a query, so that each d i is unique as well. Consider two possible blinded distances
in a location proximity query. Since each d i is unique, so is d i . Hence, each x i is generated by the random oracle with unique input in a query, so that it is independent of all others. In particular, there is no false negative. With respect to different queries, although A may obtain two distances
these two distances are associated with different random numbers w 1 = w 2 . Hence, the blinded distance d and the random value w together would ensure the input of the random oracle to be unique through all queries with overwhelming probability. As a result, in the ideal world S could use randomly chosen strings to build a set X in a location proximity query instead of the results from the random oracle. Due to the properties of the Bloom filter, A cannot infer the position of a d i (after decryption) in X from BF, where
Furthermore
To summarize, the PPLP scheme is secure under the given assumptions.
Σ ElG : A PPLP Protocol from ElGamal
In this section, we propose a PPLP protocol Σ ElG from ElGamal (KGen E , Enc E , Dec E as shown in Table 1 ). The construction of Σ ElG is similar to Σ DGK . However, we observe that the full decryption in the online phase is not necessary for party A who only needs to know the location proximity result. Thus, we replace DGK with the ECC-based lifted ElGamal scheme which results in better online communication complexity. Moreover, when increasing the security parameter, the performance of ECC operations is better than that of arithmetic modulo an RSA modulus in DGK, so Σ ElG is better suited for long-term security. The Σ ElG PPLP protocol is shown in Fig. 4 . Fig. 4 is a secure computation of F PPLP in the honest-but-curious model.
Theorem 2. If ElGamal is semantically secure and the hash function H is modeled as random oracle, then the proposed PPLP scheme Σ ElG in
The proof of this theorem is analogous to that of Theorem 1 and thus omitted.
Comparison and Experimental Results
In this section, we compare our proposed protocols with the state-of-the-art PPLP protocol of Hallgren et al. [15, 16] . We instantiate all primitives in our PPLP protocols to achieve a security level of κ = 128 bits. The secret-shared coordinates in our benchmarks are of bitlength = 32 bit and the secret-shared squared results are of bitlength σ = 64 bit. However, we restrict the cleartext domain of the coordinates to {0, . . . , 2 31.5 −1} s.t. the squared Euclidean distance fits into a 64-bit unsigned integer. This is sufficient for any coordinates on earth with sub-meter accuracy.
We benchmark our prototype C++ implementations of our PPLP protocols on two commodity servers equipped with Intel Core i7 3.5 GHz CPUs and 32 GB RAM. During our benchmarks, however, the maximum RAM requirements were in the order of a few dozen megabytes. The two machines are connected via Gigabit Ethernet. Each benchmarking result is averaged over 100 executions.
As shown in Table 3 , our protocol Σ ElG has the lowest online communication and also more efficient arithmetic than Σ DGK due to the usage of ECC instead of modular arithmetic over a 3072-bit RSA modulus. Therefore, we implemented Σ ElG , but not Σ DGK because we expect its runtimes to be worse. When utilizing Bloom filters, we use a false positive rate of 2 −ρ , where ρ is the statistical security parameter (ρ = 40) as before.
The underlying framework for our Σ ElG implementation is the mcl library ElGamal encryption over the elliptic curve secp256k1 with key size of 256 bits and 128-bit security. The mcl library supports point compression, and therefore each elliptic curve point can be represented by 256 + 1 bits. An ElGamal ciphertext consists of two elliptic curve points, i.e., 514 bits in total.
Communication
We compare the communication of our protocols in Table 3 . As can be seen from the table, the online communication and the setup communication of the ABYbased protocols is constant, whereas for the public-key based protocols the setup communication grows superlinearly with
The online round complexity of ABY Y , Σ DGK , and Σ ElG is minimal, but larger for ABY AY due to the multiplication in Additive sharing and the conversion from Additive sharing to Yao sharing, which need additional rounds of interaction. 
Benchmarks in a Local Network
In the following, we benchmark our protocols in a local Gigabit network with an average latency of 0.2 ms. We depict the runtimes and total communication of our PPLP protocols in Fig. 5 . We exclude the runtimes for the base-OTs (0.48 s in the LAN setting) for ABY Y and ABY AY , because they need to be run only for the first execution of the protocol and hence are a one-time expense. In the same manner, we exclude the one-time cost of generating the key pair and sending the public key in Σ DGK and Σ ElG (6 ms in the LAN setting). Figure 5 confirms that the complexity of ABY Y and ABY AY is independent of τ , whereas the complexity of Σ ElG grows superlinearly in τ . The online runtime also grows due to the growing size of the Bloom filter ≈ 5.5
2 ln τ and therefore the number of (non-cryptographic) hash functions that need to be computed. ABY AY has the fastest online and setup runtime, and therefore, in total performance, it is substantially better than all other protocols.
As for the communication, Σ ElG is more efficient than all other protocols for τ < 256 (the communication of Σ DGK is similar) and afterwards ABY AY is again the most efficient. Thus, Σ ElG and ABY AY are beneficial for saving communication fees in mobile data networks which charge per KB. However, ABY AY has more communication rounds (cf. Table 3 ), so it is unclear if it is also more efficient in high-latency networks which we will investigate next. [15, 16] with security level κ = 112 bit.
Benchmarks in a Simulated Mobile Network
To show the practicality of our PPLP protocols, we simulate a mobile Internet connection, where we restrict the network bandwidth to 16 Mbps and the network latency to 45 ms, which are typical average parameters for mobile Internet nowadays 3 . Although the mobile Internet is still much slower than the cable Internet, most of the developed countries already support LTE 4 that provides transfer channels with bandwidth of dozens of Mbps and a typical transfer latency of just a few dozen milliseconds. Moreover, free Wi-Fi is becoming ubiquitous especially in big cities 5 , which provides almost unlimited, fast, and low-latency access to PPLP. Thus, the prerequisites for using our algorithms greatly differ depending on the location of the deployment. Again, in the mobile Internet setting, we exclude the time needed for the base-OTs (0.75 s) and for generating the public key pair and sending the public key (0.05 s) as these are one-time expenses. We depict the online and total runtimes in the mobile Internet setting in Fig. 6 . The online time for Σ ElG is lowest due to the smallest communication and the minimal round complexity, followed by ABY Y which also has minimal round complexity, but up to factor 12× more communication (cf. Table 3 ). The online time for ABY AY is by factor 2× larger due to the larger round complexity. For the total runtimes, we see that Σ ElG is the most efficient protocol for small thresholds of τ ≤ 25 from when on the constant runtime of ABY Y with 143 ms is most efficient. The total runtime of ABY AY is not competitive and almost twice as high as that of ABY Y due to the higher round complexity 6 .
Summary
We briefly summarize the properties of and use-cases for our PPLP protocols in Table 4 . Since all our PPLP protocols have different strengths, we give possible use-cases in the following: ABY Y is advantageous in high-latency networks withhigh bandwidth; ABY AY is better-suited for low-latency networks with medium bandwidth and it is especially beneficial for computationally weak devices; Σ ElG runs fast in any network types for small values of τ . 
Conclusion
In this work, we designed, implemented, and evaluated multiple practically efficient protocols for PPLP using STPC and AHPKE. Moreover, we introduced optimizations for our protocols: using Bloom filter [4] for our AHPKE-based protocols and using Conditional Swap [21] for our Boolean circuit-based protocols. We made extensive use of the pre-computation for computationally heavy parts of our protocols in the cases where the same parties perform PPLP several times, which substantially improves performance. Finally, we evaluated our most efficient protocols in a real-world mobile Internet setting and showed practical total runtimes of below 200 ms and online runtimes of below 50 ms. We leave implementation of our protocols on mobile devices as future work.
